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Abstract
Youth unemployment is an isaue of primary concern in Western European
countries. In this paper we analyae dynamics in unemployment for youths,
adults (prime-aged individuala), and elderly. We use quarterly French un-
employment data, atratified by gender, age group, and duration, over the
period 1982-1994. We find that the inflow rate of male youths is more
sensitive to the business cycle than the inflow rate of adulta, but that the
outflow of adults is more senaitive than the outflow of youths. Seasonal ef-
fects affect youth unemployment mainly by fluctuations in the inflow. The
results are used for a policy recommendation.
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1 Introduction
There is hardly any study on youth unemployment that does not start by stating
that governments are deeply concerned by high rates of youth unemployment.
In France, the country we focus on in this paper, youth unemployment rates are
double digit and much lazger than those of adults. Moreover, French unemploy-
ment rates are higher than the OECD average. In 1994, the unemployment rate
in France was 9.7 (13.1) percent for men (women) aged 25-54, and 24.2 (31.6)
percent for men (women) aged 15-24 (OECD (1996)).
There are several economic explanations for the relatively great concern for
youth unemployment compared to unemployment in general. First, an early spell
of unemployment may increase the incidence and duration of future unemploy-
ment, because youths are not yet firmly rooted into the labour market and may
be stigmatized by an early spell of unemployment. Second, this early spell of un-
employment hampers the accumulation of human capital. Not only will human
capital not increase due to the absence of on-the-job training, the human capital
acquired at school is depreciated as well. Finally, commitment to society as a
whole may reduce, the devil finding work for idle hands (OECD (1984a)).
This concern has led the French government to enact special youth programs
and policies. In 1981 the "Future for youth plan" (Plan avenir jeunes) was brought
into effect. The main objective of this plan was to stimulate the employment of
young people by vazious economic premiums and exemptions for employers and
by various training and workfare programs. The number of participants to such
programs increased substantially after the 1986 "Emergency plan for youth em-
ployment" (Plan d'urgence pour 1'emploi des jeunes), which introduced stronger
incentives to participate and facilitated the development of new programs (see
OECD (1984b), CSERC (1996) and Bonnal, Fougère and Sérandon (1997) for
details on various programs and the numbers of individuals enrolled in them).
In this paper we study unemployment dynamics among different age groups in
a systematic way, focusing on business-cycle and calendar-time effects on the in-
flow and outflow rates of unemployment. These in turn determine the movement
of the unemployment rate over time. Most of the previous studies on labour mar-
ket dynamics have taken a micro approach (see Devine and Kiefer (1991) for an
overview). This approach focuses on personal chazacteristics that affect individual
re-employment probabilities. Macroeconomic conditions are at most included as
an additional regressor (see for example Dynarski and Sheffrin (1990)). Recently,
Sider (1985), Baker (1992), and Butler and MacDonald (1986), amongst others,
have stressed the effect of the business cycle on aggregate flows of individuals over
a long period of time, using aggregate data. A few empirical studies on unemploy-
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ment dynamics focus on the youth labour market. Clark and Summers (1982),
by examining US data from the Current Population Survey of 1976, find that the
high rate of joblessness among youths is a problem of job availability. Their data
convey a picture of a dynamic labour market, where youth employment is very
responsive to aggregate demand. The participation rate shows a large increase in
the summer months, mainly due to summer-only workers. Lynch (1985) examines
duration data for a sample of London youths taken from a longitudinal survey of
young workers in the greater London area who left school at age 16 in the summer
of 1979. The determinants of re-employment probabilities are estimated using a
Weibull proportional hazard model. The main conclusion concerns the evidence
of negative duration dependence. Lynch (1989) uses a US data set of young work-
ers (both male and female) in the National Longitudinal Survey to estimate the
determinants of re-employment probabilities. She finds strong negative duration
dependence, and differences between men and women. Moreover she finds that
local demand conditions play an important role. Chapter VI of the OECD 1983
Employment Outlook (OECD (1983)) also explores differences between youth and
adult unemployment. Youths face a much higher risk of becoming unemployed,
and most of the separations are involuntary. Moreover, youths have a higher
propensity to terminate spells of unemployment by way of withdrawing from the
labour force. The teenage labour force flows, in particular in North America, show
a strong seasonal pattern. Finally, Chapter IV of the OECD 1996 Employment
Outlook (OECD (1996)) examines the youth labour market over the 1980s and
1990s. Youth employment and unemployment seems to be exceptionally sensitive
to the overall state of the labour market. From all these empirical studies we
derive the following stylized facts on youth unemployment. First, youth unem-
ployment is much more responsive to aggregate economic conditions than adult
unemployment. Secondly, youth unemployment has a strong seasonal component.
Thirdly, youth unemployment is heterogeneous with respect to gender.
In the present paper we examine whether these results are confirmed in a
formal econometric analysis. For example, we examine to what extent youths
are disproportionally affected by a recession. We estimate a model in which the
business cycle affects the inflow and outflow into and out of unemployment. Con-
cerning the latter we adopt a model in which the individual exit probability is
duration dependent and also depends on the business cycle and on individual-
specific characteristics. It is important to allow for the latter type of characteris-
tics when dealing with cyclical effects on the exit rate out of unemployment. The
weeding out of the individuals with the highest individual-specific effects occurs
faster in the top of the cycle than in a recession (see Van den Berg and Van Ours
(1996)). As a result, individual heterogeneity causes the duration dependence of
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the aggregate exit probability to be less negative in a recession than in the top
of the cycle. If one does not take this into account then the business cycle effect
in the recession will be over-estimated; that is, the estimated effect on the in-
dividual exit probability will be less severe than the real effect. In our analysis,
we estimate different models for different age groups and genders, and we allow
for heterogeneity of unobserved individual characteristics. In sum, the estimates
provide an econometrically more careful description of the business cycle effects
than can be obtained from simply eyeballing the graphs of raw data. Note that
previous studies on unemployment durations typically assume that duration de-
pendence is invariant across age groups (some studies, however, restrict attention
to data from just one age group, see e.g. the articles by Lynch mentioned above).
In the empirical analysis we use French administrative data which distinguish
unemployment by elapsed duration and by gender. The data are quarterly and
cover the period 1982.IV-1994.IV. Our model and estimation method are based
on Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1994).
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and the
empirical implementation. Section 3 describes the data. In Section 4, the estima-
tion results are presented, and we decompose unemployment variation into the
contributions of its determinants, notably business cycle effects. From a policy
point of view, it is important to know differences across age groups of the instan-
taneous effect of the business cycle on inftow and outflow. For example, if exit
probabilities of youths respond to business cycles at a later stage than the exit
probabilities of adults, then this may help policy makers to anticipate cycles of
youth unemployment. The results can also be used to predict, for a given state of
the business cycle, which types of employed and unemployed workers suffer most
from the cycle in terms of their chances on the labour market. In Section 5 we
therefore discuss the policy implications of our results in some detail.
2 The model and the empirical implementation
In this section we describe the model for the exit probabilities out of unemploy-
ment. Since this model is described in detail in Abbring, Van den Berg and Van
Ours (1994), the present exposition is brief. In the first subsection we start with
a sketch of the type of data we use, and we discuss the role of ineasurement er-
rors. The second subsection deals with the unemployment duration model. The
parameterization of the model is discussed in the third subsection.
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2.1 Observation of unemployment
We use two measures of time, each with a different origin. The variable t denotes
the duration of a spell of unemployment for a given individual. The variable T
denotes calendar time. We take t and T to have the same measurement scale, apart
from the difference in origin. Both t and T are discrete variables. For example,
consider an individual who is unemployed for t periods at calendar time T. If he
fails to leave unemployment in period t, he will be unemployed for t-1- 1 periods
at calendar time T f 1.
Aggregate data give the total numbers of individuals in the labour matket
who are unemployed for t periods of time (t - 0, 1, 2, ...) at calendar times T(T -
Tp, Tp -F I, To t2, ...). By comparing the number of individuals who are unemployed
for t periods of time at T to the number unemployed for t~- 1 periods at T f 1,
we observe the fraction of the former who leave unemployment at t. This fraction
ofcourse equals the exit probability out of unemployment B(t~T) of an individual
who is unemployed for t periods, when calendar time equals T at the moment of
potential exit:
B(tIT) -
U(tIT) - U(t f),IT -}. I)
U(t~T) (1)
In reality we do not exactly observe the numbers U(t~T), due to e.g. rounding-
off errors and administrative errors. In addition, the unemployment definition
changes over time. We capture this by way of stochastic errors. From now on, a
tilde denotes an observed vaziable whereas the absence of a tilde denotes the true
value of the corresponding model variable. We assume that
U(t~T) - U(t~T)ee,T (2)
with
log ei,, ~ N(0, 02)
In the empirical analysis we allow for non-zero correlations between errors ei,, at
one single calendar moment. Thus, we specify the correlation between loge~.,T.
and logei..,,.. to be equal to r~~'-i"~ if T` - T", and 0 otherwise. Combining the
equations (1) and (2), we obtain
log(1 - B'(t~T)) - log(1 - B(t~T)) f e~,, (3)
where
ei,, :- logEtti,rti - loget,,
Equation (3) links the data to the true exit probabilities. In the next subsection
we present a model for B(t~T).
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2.2 The model
The model expresses the true exit probabilities in terms of the (determinants of
the) exit probabilities at the individual level. The relation is established by way
of aggregating over individual unemployment duration distributions.
It is assumed that all variation in the individual exit probabilities out of un-
employment can be explained by the prevailing unemployment duration t and
calendar time T, and by observed and unobserved heterogeneity across individ-
uals. The effect of t represents genuine duration dependence, i.e. dependence of
individual exit probabilities on the elapsed unemployment duration. Calendar
time is assumed to capture macro eífects (including business cycle and seasonal
effects) on individual exit probabilities, as well as structural changes influencing
these probabilities. In the data we use, we have two observed individual charac-
teristics that can be used as an explanatory variable x, namely the gender and age
group (youth, adult, elderly). We estimate the model separately for both gender
t,vpes and the three age groups, and in the sequel we suppress the conditioning
on the prevailing value of x.
We denote the probability that an individual leaves unemployment right after
t periods of unemployment, given that he is unemployed for t periods at cal-
endar time T, and conditional on his unobserved characteristics v, by B(t~T, v).
By definition, this is the exit probability out of unemployment (or hazard) at T
conditional on t and v. We assume proportionality of individual exit probabilities
B(t~T, v): there are functions ~t and ~i2 such that
B(tlTi v) - T~l(t) ' W2(T) - v (4)
with ~il and ~ji2 positive and uniformly bounded from above. The functions ~1 and
~i2 represent the duration dependence and the calendar time dependence of the
individual exit probabilities out of unemployment. FLrthermore, the distribution
of v is such that, for every t and T,
Pr(0 c B(t~T, v) c 1) - 1.
We now turn to the effect of calendar time at the inflow into unemployment
on the exit probabilities. We assume this to act by way of the composition of
the inflow. This is modelled by a calendar time dependent scale pazameter of the
distribution function Gr of v,
Gr(W3(T)v) - G(v)
with G(v) the distribution of the composition of the inflow at the calendaz time
base r - 0, and ~i3 positive and uniformly bounded from above. If r(i3(T) ~ 1
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then the individuals entering unemployment at T on average have lower values of
their unobserved characteristics (i.e. lower exit probabilities) than the individuals
entering at the calendar time base. For instance, this parameter could capture
the effect of (relatively) highly qualified graduates, usually entering the labour
market in the third quarter. To express the exit probabilities B(t~r) appearing in
the r.h.s. of equation (3) in terms of B(t~r, v), we have to integrate v out of the
latter. It can be shown that the following relation holds (see Abbring, Van den
Berg and Van Ours (1994)),
B1tIT) - Wl(t)~2(T)W3(T-t)Ev~v
1it-I(1 -~1(t - 2)~2(T - Z)W3(T - t)y)~
E„~n~-i(I - tGi(t - i)~z(t - i)~a(T - t)v)~ (5)
in which E„(.) denotes the expectation with respect to the distribution G. Sub-
stitution of equation (5) in equation (3) establishes the link between the observed
exit probabilities and the model determinants.
Our model is closed by the specification of an equation for the inflow size (the
incidence equation). We measure the size of the inflow by the number of people
in the first duration class U(O~r). This number is smaller than the true inflow,
because people who enter and leave within a quarter are excluded.l We specify
U(O~T) - ~a(T) (6)
with the function ~ia positive and uniformly bounded from above. Substitution of
(6) into equation ( 2) links the observed U(O~r) and the unknown function zlia(r).
In the model described above, the sttuctural determinants are the functions
~1, ~z, ~i3, ~a and G. As shown by Van den Berg and Van Ours ( 1996), the as-
sumptions above ensure nonparametric identifiability of the model without effects
of calendar time at the moment of inflow. In particular, they ensure that duration
dependence and unobserved heterogeneity can be distinguished empirically with-
out the need to specify parametric functional forms on the shape of t~l or G. ~om
equation ( 5) it is clear that the functions t~il(t) and ~iz(r) are identified from the
multiplicative effect on B(t~T) of respectively t and r. By expanding the product
terms in equation (5) it follows that B(t~r) depends on G(v) by way of the first
t f 1 moments of v, denoted by p,;, and that these are identified from interaction
effects between t and r ( i.e., between t~il(t) and t~iz(T)) in B(t~r). If the calendar
time effect on t~i3 is repetitive, as in case of seasonal effects, then ~i3 is identified,
see Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours ( 1994). In the sequel, we assume that
'In the literature both this measure and the true inflow have been used (e.g. Layard, Nickell
and Jackman (1991)). Flom additional analysis it is cleaz that the dynamic features of both
series aze similaz.
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~i3 only includes seasonal effects. The function ~r~i4 is trivially identified from the
U(O~r) data.
2.3 Parameterization
We adopt the nonparametric estimation method by Abbring, Van den Berg and
Van Ours (1994). First,
"~~ ne-1 ll
Y'1(t) - exP 1 ~ T~I;II,i(t) 1l .-o
in which I;,i - 1 if t- i and 0 otherwise, and ni is the number of duration classes
considered. The unobserved heterogeneity distribution is estimated through the
"parameters" representing its normalized moments {~l, ys, ya, ..., ryn,;
F~~
?'; ~- Fri
We adopt products of flexible high-order polynomials (capturing business cy-
cle effects) and dummy variables (capturing seasonal effects) for the structural
functions ~i2 and z~i4. In notation to be explained below,
wj(T) - ~j(T) ~j,clT)i ~ - Zi4~
whereas ~i3(r) is specified to equal ~3(T). The seasonal effects in ~,~3 and ~(i9
are specified as
Wi(T) - eXp S ~~sir~(T) 1 (7)le-1
where I, is an indicator function for season s, s- 1, ..., S. The cyclical and trend
effects in ~Z and ~i4 are represented by polynomials of indexed order that aze mu-
tually orthogonal on the data interval for r. Let the functions pl (r), p2(r),p3 (r), ...
denote these Chebyshev polynomials. Then
k
T~j,~(T) - ~atipt(T), 1 - 2,4.
:-o
Note that we can compare our estimates to the way in which conventional business
cycle indicators behave over time. We normalize the duration model by taking
~oz -~03 - 1, ~al - Wal - 0(so the first season is the base season), and
~Gl (0) - I(so ~lo - 0). We normalize the incidence model by taking ~~ - 1
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and ~41 - 0. Finally, we include a multiplicative term exp(c) in a(i4i where c is a
parameter to be estimated.
Before finishing this section we point out a procedure to test the MPH as-
sumption (see Van den Berg and Van Ours (1996)). Consider the estimates of
ryz, .., ry,,,. If the model is correct, then ry2i .., ry,,, are mutually consistent as nor-
malized moments of a distribution with positive bounded support (from zero until
the upper bound depending on the functions zGl and ~i2). This can be tested for.
For example, if ry2 c 1 or ry3 c y2 then there is no distribution with positive
support that is able to generate such moments (see Shohat and Tamarkin (1970);
for example ry2 C 1 would imply Var(v) G 0). Similar constraints must hold for
the higher order moments. These tests are useful as specification tests, as they
can be shown to be informative on the validity of the proportionality assumption
(equation (4); see Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1994)).
3 The data
We use French administrative data on numbers of unemployed individuals in
three age groups: youths (aged below 25), adults (aged 25-49) and elderly people
(aged 50 and over), for both genders. These were collected by the French public
employment offices (A.N.P.E.), and subsequently collected on a nation-wide scale
by the Department of Labour. They cover individuals who are actively looking
for full-time permanent jobs, and who are immediately available. The data are
collected each quarter, and they allow for calculation of exit probabilities out of
the first five quarterly duration classes, over the period 1982.IV-1994.IV. The
latter time interval cannot be lengthened, because from 1995.I onwards the def-
initions of the administrative data changed substantially, causing an irreparable
break in the series. Each quarter, a number of individuals move from one age
group to another. We do not have data on these numbers, but their magnitude
should be very small in comparison to the size of the inflow and outflow.
Unemployed individuals need to register at a public employment office in order
to be eligible for unemployment benefits. However, since 1984, older unemployed
individuals are exempted from seeking employment and registering. During the
past decade, the age limit has been decreased from 57.5 to 55 years. As a result,
we expect the data on elderly unemployed to be less informative. It is impor-
tant to note that individuals may not only leave the unemployment statistics for
employment. Participation in training schemes is an additional reason for exit,
according to the employment offices.
Figure la shows the development of unemployment levels of male and female
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youths. The overall pattern is the same for both genders, male youth unemploy-
ment being lower than female youth unemployment. After a sharp rise in the
early 1980s, a sharp decline sets in until 1990. The early 1990s show an increase
again, but this increase is less modest for young men. This cyclical pattern is
almost absent in the unemployment figures of adults (see Figure lb). There we
see a strong linear upwazd trend for both men and women. The levels of un-
employment are more or less the same for adult men and women. The level of
unemployment of the elderly is nearly constant over time, unemployment levels
being higher for older men than for older women (see Figure lc).
The graphs in Figures ld-lf on the inflow size as a function of time resemble
those for the unemployment levels. The inflow size for youths shows a downward
trend, while the inflow size for adults is strongly upward trended. The inflow
size for elderly is more or less constant. The trend for youths is caused by the
declining participation rates for youths. This can be seen from Figures lg-li,
where the inflow rate is graphed. The inflow rate is defined as the inflow size
divided by the sizez of employment, for each age~gender group.3 F~om the figures
it is clear that the inflow rate for youths is not downward trended. The inflow
rate equals the probability of inflow into unemployment for a randomly-chosen
employed participant. Therefore, this variable is more relevant for our purposes
than the inflow size. In the next section we therefore focus on the inflow rates. In
particular, ~iq (r) is estimated from inflow rate data.
The upward trend in the inflow size for adult women is also due to a certain
extent to the increased participation rate ofadult women (compaze Figures le and
lh; note however from Figure lh that the inflow rates for male and female adults
have both increased over time). The upward trended inflow size of adults and the
downward trended inflow size of youths cause the share of youths in the inflow
siae to diminish over time. In 1983 the inflow size share of male (female) youths
amounted to 52 (56) percent. By 1994, this share had shrunk to 29 (33) percent.
The inflow size shaze of elderly during this period was more or less constant over
time, being 7(6) percent for men (women). In sum, the composition of the inflow
~We use labour force survey data from Eurostat to quantify the number of employed. These
aze based on a different definition of labour mazket states than the administrative data (Van
den Berg and Van der Klaauw (1998)), but unfortunately we do not have employment eize data
based on the latter definition. The employment data aze yeazly, but as the number of employed
is much larger than the inflow size, seasonal fluctuations in the employment size should not
have a substantial effect on the inflow rate.
3The declining participation rate for youths ia a typical F~ench phenomenon; it reflects the
extension of school attendance over this period (CSERC (1996)). The decline may be the result
of a decision of youths to stay out of the labour mazket and enrol in further education becawe
of the high risk of unemployment. It is not cleaz whether this is des'uable or not.
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size has changed in terms of age. Note that if one would ignore the change in
composition, and merge the data of all age groups together for a single empirical
analysis, then the results would be biased.
Compared to other age groups, the inflow size for youths is high. For youths,
U(O~T) constitutes on average about 40 percent of total unemployment at a date
T, whereas this is about 25 percent for adults and 15 percent for elderly workers.
These numbers indicate a dynamic youth labour market. This is also conveyed
by the empirical exit probabilities in the data. Figure 2 shows the relationship
between empirical exit probabilities out of unemployment and unemployment
duration, averaged over calendar time. Obviously, youths have the highest exit
probabilities. The fact that inflow and outflow rates for youths are high is well
documented (see the references in Section 1). High youth inflow rates may be
due to the fact that many young workers are still searching for a good match.
High youth outflow rates may be due to the fact that youths are flexible and have
on average lower benefits. In France, both may also be due to a specific type of
youth job contracts with little or no job protection. We return to this in the next
section.
For youths and adults, the exit probability declines (non-monotonously) over
the duration, while for the elderly it is more or less constant. There are small
differences in the level of the exit probabilities for men and women in the first du-
ration classes. For higher duration classes the exit probabilities are approximately
the same across gender. The decline of the unemployment exit probability over
the duration of unemployment can be due to unobserved heterogeneity, negative
duration dependence, or a combination of both. The non-monotonicity on the
other hand may be caused by the unemployment benefit system and a duration-
dependent flow into public employment programs.
In 1986, the procedure according to which the data are collected was changed.
As a result, the time series on U(t~r) exhibit ruptures at 1986.IV. Further, the
policy towards youth unemployment changed substantially in the mid-1980s as
well, resulting in for instance the 1986 Emergency Plan for Youth Employment,
mentioned in the introduction. For these reasons, we add to the model a dummy
variable d(T) equalling one if T is after 1986.IV and zero otherwise. In particular,
we multiply the expressions for U(O~r) and B(O~r) in the corresponding model
equations by (d~~8~)d~'l , in which dy87 is a parameter to be estimated. We do not




Concerning the exit out of unemployment, we estimate a five-equation model
for exit out of the first five duration classes (see equation (5)), for each gender-
type and age group separately. The model expressions for B(t~r) become very
complicated for higher duration classes, and this complicates their use in the
model estimation. However, below we show that the estimation results can in turn
be used to make certain inferences on unemployment dynamics in higher duration
classes. Estimation of incidence equation (6), using incidence observations U(O~t),
completes the analysis of unemployment dynamics. The model is estimated by
Maximum Likelihood. The cyclical components in ~i2 and ~i4 are modeled using
fifth-degree polynomials.9
It turns out that for the elderly we encountered problems in estimating the
duration model, in particular the ry; parameters. As noted in Subsection 2.2,
these parameters are identi6ed from the interactions (or cross effects) of t and r
in B(t~r). The number of iterations required for the ML algorithm to converge was
very large, as were the resulting standard errors of the ry; estimates. (This does
not depend on the number of duration classes (i.e. on the number of equations
used in the estimation.) As a result, we could not reject the null hypothesis that
there is no unobserved heterogeneity among the elderly. This may be explained
by the way the data on elderly are collected. As noted in Section 3, unemployed
individuals older than 55 (previously 57.5) do not have to register in order to
be eligible for unemployment benefits. Therefore, the administrative data only
contain information on a subset of people who do not want to retire and expect
that they will easier find a job by registering. We decided to estimate for the
elderly a modified version of the duration model described in Subsection 2.2, not
allowing for unobserved heterogeneity. Equation (4) then reduces to
B(tlTiv) - 4'1(t)' W2(T)
where the functions ~Gl and ~iz are parameterized as described in Subsection 2.3.
4According to statistical tests and graphical eyeball checka, the fit of the model is not
improved by including higher-order polynomial terms.
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4.2 Business cycles and the age-specific incidence of un-
employment
Tables 1, 2, and 3 present the estimates of the equation for the inflow rate into
unemployment. Figures 3a and 3b show the combined trend and cycle in the
estimated inflow rate zli4(T) (i.e., they show the estimated t~i4(r) evaluated at the
average value of its seasonal component; the value on the vertical axis can be
interpreted as the de-seasonalized quarterly probability that a randomly chosen
employed worker becomes unemployed). The inflow rate is upward trended for
adults and elderly, whereas there is no strong trend for youths. To compare the
cyclical fluctuations across age groups and gender types, we filter out the trend,
using a Hodrick-Prescott filters. We then calculate the relative deviations from
this trend. The results are shown in Figures 3c and 3d.s
The capacity utilization ratio and Real GDP growth are conventional business
cycle indicators. Figure 4 shows the development of these indicators for France
over the period 1984.I-1994.IV. By comparing the capacity utilization ratio and
Real GDP growth to the cyclical fluctuations in the incidence for men, it follows
that, for all age groups, male incidence is counter-cyclical, while female incidence
is hardly cyclical at all. The latter can be explained by a discouraged worker
effect. Women who are not entitled to unemployment benefits may decide not
to register at the ANPE during a recession, feeling that it is useless. They may
therefore tend to stay non-participant. The strong cyclicality of male incidence
can be explained by the fact that men are strongly represented in sectors that
are sensitive to cyclical shocks (OECD (1996)), like manufacturing.
The inflow is most volatile for male youths. This, as well as the high level of the
inflow for youths, can be explained by institutional features of the French labour
market (see Cohen, Lefranc and Saint-Paul (1997), who observe high separation
rates for French young workers in labour force survey data). In particular, one
can distinguish between two types of employment contracts: short-term contracts
of one year, renewable once, with inexpensive separation possibilities (CDDs or
"contrats à durée determinée" ) on the one hand, and long-term contracts in which
involuntary job termination is difficult (CDIs or "contrats à durée indeterminée" )
on the other. The short-term contracts are often used for young workers. Obvi-
ously, the workers with such contracts have a high inflow rate into unemployment.
SThis smoothing method selects the trend path that minimizes the sum of the squazed
deviations, subject to the constraint that the sum of the squazed second differences not be too
lazge. This constraint determines the smoothness. We have set the smoothness pazameter to
the value 1600, as recommended in the literatute, see Prescott (1996).
BThe estimated relative Auctuations in the inflow size (not reported here) aze virtually the
same as in the inftow rate, as should be expected.
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This contributes to the high youth inflow rate. Cohen, Lefranc and Saint-Paul
(1997) argue that youths thus bear the full burden of the increased flexibility of
the French labour market. The option to be able to fire workers at low cost is
particularly attractive for firms in a recession, so one may expect the inflow rate
into unemployment for the corresponding workers to be particularly high during
a recession. This is exactly what we find.
There is no systematic difference between the phases of the cycles for young
men and adult men. Since 1988, the cycle for male youths seems to lag one year
behind the cycle for adult men.
We finish this subsection with an examination of the estimated seasonal pat-
tern in the incidence of unemployment. For youths, this is characterized by no-
tably higher incidence in the second half of the year, probably caused by youths
entering the labour market after leaving school. To obtain a closer look at the
seasonal pattern in the inflow, we estimate a more general version of equation (7);
4 ( ll
w4(T) - exP 1~ tw4a f~ad(T)~ la(T) 1la-I
where d(r) is a dummy variable equalling 1 if r is after 1986.IV and 0 otherwise.
We normalize w41 -~1 - 0, taking the first season as the base season. This
equation incorporates an interaction effect between the policy dummy and the
season. It turns out that the parameter estimates as reported in Table 1 hardly
change. Furthermore, for women ~c3 and for men kZ and ~c3 are significant and
negative. This suggests that the policy towards youth unemployment has had a
dampening effect on the inflow rate of school leavers. For adults and elderly, the
incidence of unemployment is not much affected by the season.
4.3 Business cycles and the age-specific duration of un-
employment
The estimation results for the duration model are shown in Tables 4, 5, and 6.
In this subsection we focus on the estimates of the parameters of interest (i.e.,
those concerning calendar-time effects). Figures 5a and 5b show the combined
trend and cycle in the outflow' Exit probabilities are on average higher for men
than for women. Youths have on average the highest exit probabilities. (Note
that the parameter ~1 can be interpreted as the average exit probability out of
rPrecisely, they show the estimated ~z(r) multiplied by pi. This equals the euit probability
out of the first duration class, evaluated at the average value of the seasonal effect on the exit
probabilities, if the season of in8ow is the fust season.
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the first duration class. The estimate of this probability is much larger for youths
than for adults.) Young workers are attractive because of the type of contract on
which they can be hired. In addition, many young workers leave unemployment
to special youth training and workfare programs. It is not clear whether the latter
type of exits from unemployment are very attractive. Some of the workfare pro-
grams do not seem to provide much valuable work experience (Bonnal, Fougère
and Sérandon (1997)). Also, some programs resemble regular employment, with
the crucial difference that wages are allowed to be below the mandatory mini-
mum wage for adults (Abowd et al. (1997)). From a study of individual labour
market histories, Abowd et al. (1997) conclude that the individual probability
of unemployment increases substantially at the moment at which the individual
crosses the maximum age for these programs (usually 25 years). In sum, the youth
outflow rate level by itself may suggest a rosier picture than warranted by the
positions taken after exit out of unemployment and long-run prospects in general.
The outflow rates for adults seem to be rather strongly downward trended.
Figures 5c and 5d show the relative deviations from the trend, for each age group.
The pattern described by the deviations resembles the pattern described by the
conventional business cycle indicators (see Figure 4), so the exit probabilities are
pro-cyclically affected. A striking result is that the exit probabilities of young
workers are less affected by the cycle than those of adult workers. This is actually
in agreement with the importance of youth job contracts. In a recession, hiring
young workers is relatively attractive in comparison to hiring adult workers, for
the reason that the former can be fired easily. In other words, the main advantage
of hiring youths in a recession is not that they can be hired so easily but rather
that they can be fired so easily.
The phase of the cycle differs between men and women. For men, the turning
points aze about a half to one year earlier in time than they aze for women.
This can be explained by the fact that men are over-represented in sectors that
are sensitive to cyclical shocks from abroad, like manufacturing sectors, which are
leading sectors in economic cycles. Women predominantly work in service sectors.
The seasonal effect on the outflow works by way of a direct effect on the
outflow probabilities, and by way of an indirect effect on the composition of
the inflow. The direct seasonal effect on the outflow probabilities of youths is
small. Adults and elderly experience a strong negative effect in the fourth quarter,
relative to the first quarter. The indirect seasonal effect on the composition of
the inflow is similar for youths and adults. (Remember we do not estimate this
effect for elderly.) Individuals who become unemployed in the second half of the
year have more success in leaving unemployment quickly.
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4.4 The other parameter estimates
In this subsection we briefly discuss the estimates of the other model parameters,
most of which are included into the model in order to ensure that the calendar-
time effect parameters are correctly estimated.
The parameter ryz by definition equals 1~- Var(v)~E(v)2. Therefore, if the
estimate of ry2 does not significantly differ from 1, there is no unobserved hetero-
geneity. This is the case for youths. The moments of the unobserved heterogeneity
distribution G(v) are consistent with a degenerate distribution in v-~el. Note
that this does not mean that all youths are the same; it merely means that they
do not have significantly different individual exit probabilities. It should be noted
that this result may be sensitive to the proportionality assumption (4) and to the
assumption that the rupture in the data at 1986.IV is due to external factors.
We return to this below.
For male adults, the moment-inequalities imply a discrete distribution with
two positive points of support. The unobserved heterogeneity of female adults,
on the other hand, can be described by a discrete distribution with three positive
points of support.s Note that for both age groups we have found distributions
that are consistent with the estimated normalized moments. This supports the
MPH specification.
The duration dependence pazameter estimates for youths indicate a non-
monotonous but insignificant dependence. Testing the null hypothesis ~1i -
0, (i - 1, 2, 3, 4), the Wald statistic is 6.0 for women and 8.1 for men. There-
fore, for both male and female youths the null hypothesis is not rejected at a 5
percent significance level. For adults and elderly we find significant positive dura-
tion dependence during the first five quarters of unemployment. This dependence
is strongest for women. As a result, stigma effects do not seem to play a dominant
role during the first five quarters of unemployment.
Our empirical analysis so faz has been based on the exit probabilities out of
the first five quarters of unemployment. We now present a procedure to extend
sThis suggests that the vaziation across female adults is lazger than across male adults, and
this is confirmed by the higher value of the estimate of rya for female adults. It may be interesting
to infer the specification of the implied discrete unobserved heterogeneity distribution. For male
adulta it turns out that 86Q1o of the in8ow into unemployment ha.s a heterogeneity value equal
to 0.80 times the mean ~1 of the distribution, and 14"lo has a heterogeneity value equal to
2.27 times this mean ( so Pr(v - O.SOpi) - 0.86 and Pr(v - 2.27~si) - 0.14). For adult
women, Pr(v - 0.22~~) - 0.24, Pr(v - 1.09p1) - 0.70, Pr(v - 3.31~1) - 0.05. Thus,
among female adults, there is a amall subgroup with a very large exit probability. Among adult
men, the group with a very high exit probability is a somewhat lazger. The individuala in these
groups disappeaz rapidly from unemployment, as the duration proceeds.
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this analysis to higher duration classes. As argued above, unobserved hetero-
geneity can be characterized by a discrete distribution. Assuming these implied
distributions are the true distributions, we can extend our empirical analysis to
higher duration classes without much computational burden. Along this line, we
estimate the ~1; parameters, for i- 5, ..,17, using data on exit probabilities for
19 (quarterly) duration classes, fixing the other parameters on their estimated
values in the 5-equation duration model. The results are shown in Figures 6a
and 6b. All age groups show negative duration dependence after 4 quarters of
unemployment. The duration dependence of youths and elderly is moderate. Af-
ter 13 quarters of unemployment the individual exit probabilities of both groups
increase. This may be due to the expiration of benefits or by an artefact of the
data collection procedure (the small number of unemployed in these high du-
ration classes causes the exit probability to be inexactly measured). The latter
explanation is supported by the fact that the effect does not show up for adults,
who constitute the largest group and as such are relatively abundant in the higher
duration classes.
The measurement errors all have a standard deviation close to 0.04, and they
are positively correlated across duration classes at one calendar moment. From
this we conclude that the model fits the data well, and that misclassification of
unemployed individuals into adjacent duration classes is not a major source of
errors in the observed unemployment figures. The estimates of d~~B7 indicate a
significant positive effect for all gender types and age groups. This effect varies
between 5 and 15 percent for the incidence equation and between 11 and 18
percent for the equation for B(O~r). There is not much difference across genders.
Also, the effect is not larger for youths than for adults. This suggests that the
significant effect of the dummy variable is not caused by policy towards youth
employment, but rather by the changes in the data collection procedure.
5 Conclusions
In France, like in many other Western European countries, both the level and
the turnover of youth unemployment are high in comparison to adult unemploy-
ment. In this paper we have examined the dynamics of age- and gender-specific
unemployment, by estimating the calendar-time behaviour of the unemployment
inflow and outflow rates, taking account of duration dependence, individual het-
erogeneity, and seasonality in the data. For youths, there does not appear to be a
strong long-run trend in the inflow or outflow rates. The inflow size has decreased
for youths and for adult women, but this is a consequence of the declining partic-
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ipation rates for these groups. For adults, the inflow rates have increased, and the
outflow rates have decreased. In this sense, youths fared better than adults during
the past decades. However, this is to a certain extent due to the special youth
training and workfare programs, and it is not always clear that these improve the
long-run labour market prospects of youths.
Concerning cyclical effects, it turns out that in general the inflow rate is
counter-cyclical whereas the outflow rate is pro-cyclical. For women, the cycles
in the inflow rate are not pronounced. This may be due to a discouraged worker
effect during recessions, and to a lower incentive to register as unemployed. The
strong cyclicality of the male inflow rate can be explained by the fact that men
are strongly represented in sectors that are sensitive to cyclical shocks. For men,
the cycle in the inflow rate is somewhat larger for youths than for adults. For both
men and women, the cycle in the outflow is somewhat smaller for youths. The
volatility of the youth unemployment rate can thus be attributed to the volatility
of the youth inflow rate, whereas for adults the opposite is closer to the truth.
Many differences in cyclical behaviour between (male) youths and (male)
adults can be explained by institutional features of the ~ench labour market.
Young workers are often employed in jobs with short-term contracts or in train-
ing or workfare programs. The former can be argued to contribute to the high
youth inflow and outflow rates, the volatility of the youth inflow rate, and the
lack of volatility of the youth outflow rate. The latter programs can be argued to
contribute to the high youth outflow rates.
There is no systematic difference between the phases of the inflow cycles for
young men and adult men. Since 1988, the cycle for male youths seems to lag one
year behind the cycle for adult men, but before 1988 the ordering is reversed. From
the other parameter estimates, the most important result concerns the negative
duration dependence of the youth exit probability after a year of unemployment.
These results imply some policy suggestions. As explained in the introduc-
tion to this paper, long-term youth unemployment is very undesirable. A given
young individual in the inflow has the highest ptobability of becoming long-term
unemployed if he enters unemployment in a recession. Moreover, youth inflow is
highest during a recession, and youth exit probabílities are negatively duration
dependent. Thus, policy against long-term youth unemployment should focus on
unemployed youths in a recession who have been unemployed for more than a
year. Another result with some relevance for policy concerns the fact that it could
not be unambiguously established that the adult inflow rate is a leading indicator
of the youth inflow rate.
Finally, our results highlight the importance of seasonal fluctuations. Here
we find some major differences between youth and adult unemployment. These
17
differences are related to the inflow into unemployment. The large seasonal fluctu-
ations in youth unemployment are to a large extent driven by fluctuations in the
inflow that are presumably caused by the large number of school leavers entering
the labour market in the third quarter of the year.
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Table 1. Parameter estimates incidence. Age group c 25.




c -2.487 (0.027) -2.486 (0.028)
cycle
ala 0.033 (0.027) 0.003 (0.028)
a2a 0.115 (0.012) 0.079 (0.013)
aaa 0.092 (0.011) 0.053 (0.012)
aaa -0.049 (0.012) -0.020 (0.012)
asa -0.027 (0.010) 0.004 (0.010)
season
wZa -0.112 (0.018) 0.058 (0.018)
w3a 0.442 (0.018) 0.694 (0.018)
waa 0.364 (0.018) 0.339 (0.018)
measurement error
0 0.044 (0.004) 0.044 (0.004)
d~~87 1.124 (0.043) 1.176 (0.046)
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Table 2. Parameter estimates incidence. Age group 25-49.




c -3.789 ( 0.024) -3.654 (0.021)
cycle
ala 0.159 (0.021) 0.249 (0.016)
a2a 0.033 (0.010) -0.050 (0.008)
aaa 0.005 (0.009) -0.043 (0.008)
aaa -0.032 (0.009) 0.013 (0.008)
asa -0.028 (0.008) 0.006 (0.006)
season
wya -0.151 (0.015) -0.097 ( 0.012)
w3a 0.008 ( 0.015) 0.119 ( 0.012)
~aa 0.127 ( 0.015) 0.064 ( 0.012)
measurement error
a 0.035 ( 0.004) 0.029 ( 0.003)
dy87 1.096 ( 0.034) 1.094 ( 0.028)
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Table 3. Parameter estimates incicience. .4ge group 50f.




c -4.372 (0.034) -4.474 (0.025)
cycle
~ta 0.081 (0.030) 0.124 (0.021)
~2a -0.017 (0.014) -0.064 (0.011)
~aa -0.003 (0.013) -0.020 (0.010)
~aa -0.066 (0.014) -0.017 (0.010)
asa -0.033 (0.011) -0.001 (0.008)
season
wza -0.144 (0.021) -0.105 (0.015)
~sa -0.119 (0.021) -0.052 (0.015)
~aa 0.022 (0.021) 0.017 (0.015)
measurement error
0 0.051 (0.005) 0.037 (0.004)
dys~ 1.184 (0.054) 1.098 (0.036)
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Table 4. Parameter estimates duration. Age group c 25.




ul 0.445 ( 0.009) 0.351 ( 0.009)
ry2 1.037 ( 0.029) 1.031 ( 0.054)
ry3 1.155 ( 0.136) 1.066 (0.279)
rya 1.452 (0.514) 1.260 (1.282)
rys 2.117 ( 1.778) 2.825 ( 5.554)
duration dependence
~11 0.021 ( 0.030) 0.007 ( 0.037)
~G12 -0.061 ( 0.049) -0.034 ( 0.069)
~Gla -0.097 ( 0.058) 0.030 ( 0.083)
~Gla -0.053 ( 0.063) 0.066 ( 0.097)
cycle out9ow
at2 -0.062 (0.009) -0.036 ( 0.010)
a22 -0.051 (0.007) - 0.044 ( 0.008)
a32 -0.025 (0.007) - 0.062 ( 0.009)
aa2 0.063 (0.006) 0.041 ( 0.007)
asz -0.001 (0.005) -0.006 ( 0.007)
season outflow
wz2 -0.132 (0.030) -0.035 ( 0.036)
W32 -0.085 (0.024) 0.010 ( 0.030)
w42 0.041 (0.025) 0.147 ( 0.032)
season composition inflow
c.rz3 -0.012 (0.005) 0.003 ( 0.006)
W33 0.018 (0.007) 0.012 ( 0.010)
wa3 0.034 (0.008) 0.035 ( 0.011)
measurement error
a 0.042 (0.003) 0.037 (0.003)
p 0.614 (0.055) 0.649 ( 0.059)
dysT 1.123 (0.018) 1.112 ( 0.021)
Moment-inequality statistics (Wald w.r t. 0)
Men Women
ryZ - 1 1.283 0.576
ry3 - ry2 0.920 0.013
7zrya - ry3 - rya - 72 f 27z1'3 0.103 0.172
ry3rys - ry4 -`Y2`YS - ry3 f 272ry37a -0.228 -0.218
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Table 5. Parameter estimates duration. Age group 25-49.




{~i 0.321 (0.007) 0.252 ( 0.007)
ry2 1.260 (0.059) 1.445 ( 0.069)
ry3 2.056 (0.296) 2.902 (0.374)
rya 3.883 ( 1.252) 7.600 (1.754)
rys 6.308 (5.311) 22.599 (8.064)
duration dependence
~11 0.124 (0.033) 0.230 (0.032)
~iz 0.094 (0.052) 0.241 (0.055)
~~3 0.091 (0.062) 0.352 (0.068)
~la 0.173 (0.068) 0.534 (0.077)
cycle outflow
al2 -0.177 (0.012) -0.191 ( 0.016)
a~ -0.001 ( 0.007) -0.058 ( 0.012)
a32 -0.040 ( 0.008) - 0.126 ( U.012)
aa2 0.077 ( 0.006) 0.052 ( 0.009)
asz 0.033 ( 0.006) 0.035 ( 0.009)
season outflow
~ -0.070 ( 0.029) - 0.055 (0.037)
~3s -0.081 ( 0.025) 0.034 (0.030)
~az -0.261 ( 0.031) -0.279 (0.041)
season composition inflow
w23 -0.014 (0.005) -0.006 (0.007)
~s3 0.019 (0.006) 0.030 (0.007)
~a3 0.054 (0.005) 0.050 (0.007)
measurement error
a 0.025 (0.002) 0.025 ( 0.002)
p 0.732 (0.051) 0.761 ( 0.048)
dyB7 1.137 (0.017) 1.179 (0.026)
Moment-inequality statistica (Wald w.r t. 0)
Men Women
ry2 - 1 4.366 6.500
73 - ry2 2.880 3.965
?'s1'a - rys - rya - 7z f 2ryz7s -0.703 2.276
?'37s - 74 - 7275 - 73 t 272737a -1.522 -0.119
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Table 6. Parameter estimates duration. Age group 50-~.




~ill 0.240 (0.057) 0.467 (0.080)
~ilz 0.059 (0.060) 0.193 (0.088)
~G13 0.150 (0.057) 0.254 (0.083).
~la 0.274 (0.056) 0.335 (0.082)
cycle outflow
aaz 0.156 (0.011) 0.127 (0.013)
alz 0.013 (0.004) 0.014 (0.004)
~zz 0.001 (0.003) 0.008 (0.003)
a!3z 0.006 (0.003) 0.000 (0.003)
aaz 0.016 (0.003) 0.008 (0.003)
a52 0.005 (0.003) 0.005 (0.003)
season outflow
~zz -0.249 (0.100) -0.359 (0.171)
m3z -0.051 (0.059) -0.037 (0.070)
~az -0.467 (0.107) -0.829 (0.150)
measurement error
0 0.036 (0.003) 0.036 (0.004)
p 0.703 (0.062) 0.650 (0.102)
dy87 1.379 (0.081) 1.631 (0.137)
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